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1. Introduction
Individuals and firms have desires to avoid consequences wherein ex-post suboptimal
decisions appear to have been made even though these decisions are ex-ante optimal based
on the information available at that time. Taking this into consideration, Bell (1982, 1983)
and Loomes and Sugden (1982) develop regret theory that defines regret as the disutility
arising from not having chosen the ex-post optimal alternative, which is later axiomatized
by Quiggin (1994) and Sugden (1993). Indeed, there is an extensive experimental literature
that documents pervasive regret-averse preferences among individuals and firms (Loomes,
1988; Loomes et al., 1992; Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Starmer and Sugden, 1993).
Wong (2014) has recently incorporated regret theory into Sandmo’s (1971) model of
the competitive firm under price uncertainty.1 To this end, Wong (2014) characterizes
the firm’s regret-averse preferences by a modified utility function that includes additive
separable disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives.2 The extent of
regret depends on the difference between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained
by making the optimal production decision had the firm observed the true realization of
the random output price.
In this paper, we revisit Wong’s (2014) model by deriving sufficient conditions under
which regret aversion has unambiguous effect on the firm’s production decision. We show
that the firm optimally produces more (less) when regret aversion prevails if the random
output price is positively (negatively) skewed. In this case, high (low) output prices are
much more likely to be seen than low (high) output prices. To avoid regret, the firm is
induced to raise (lower) its output optimal level. The skewness of the price distribution as
such plays a pivotal role in determining how regret aversion affects the firm’s production
decision, which is a novel result in the literature.
1Wong (2014) is closely related to the early work of Paroush and Venezia (1979) who examine the
competitive firm under uncertainty with a bivariate utility function defined on profits and regret.
2Other applications of regret theory include Braun and Muermann (2004), Broll et al. (2015), Muermann
et al. (2006), and Wong (2011, 2012, 2015).
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of the
competitive firm under uncertainty when the firm’s preferences exhibit regret aversion.
Section 3 examines the effect of regret aversion on the firm’s optimal output level. The final
section concludes.
2. The model
Consider the single-period model of the competitive firm under price uncertainty a`
la Sandmo (1971). At the beginning of the period, the firm produces a single commodity
according to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and C(Q)
is compounded to the end of the period. Since the firm’s production technology exhibits
decreasing returns to scale, the cost function has the properties that C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and
C′(Q) > 0 and C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.
At the end of the period, the firm sells its entire output, Q, at the then prevailing per-
unit price, P˜ , which is unknown ex ante.3 The uncertain per-unit price, P˜ , is distributed
according to a known cumulative distribution function (CDF), F (P ), over support [P, P ],
where 0 < P < P .4 The firm’s end-of-period profit as a function of P is given by
Π(P ) = PQ −C(Q), (1)
for all P ∈ [P, P ].
We assume that the firm’s preferences are represented by the following “modified” utility
function that includes some compensation for regret:
U(Π) = Π− βG(R), (2)
3Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
4An alternative way to model the price uncertainty is to apply the concept of information systems that
are conditional cumulative distribution functions over a set of signals imperfectly correlated with P˜ (Broll
et al., 2014).
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where β > 0 is a positive constant, and G(R) is a regret function defined over the magnitude
of regret, R, such that G(0) = 0, and G′(R) > 0 and G′′(R) > 0 for all R > 0.5 The
magnitude of regret, R = Πmax − Π, is measured by the difference between the actual
profit, Π, and the maximum profit, Πmax, that the firm could have earned at the end of
the period should the firm have made the optimal production decision based on knowing
the true per-unit price, P . Since Π cannot exceed Πmax, the firm experiences disutility
from forgoing the possibility of undertaking the ex-post optimal production decision. The
parameter, β, is a constant regret coefficient that reflects the increasing importance of regret
aversion in representing the firm’s preferences as β increases.
To characterize the regret-averse firm’s optimal production decision, we have to first
determine the maximum profit, Πmax. If the firm could have observed the true per-unit
price, P , the maximum profit would be achieved if the firm had chosen Q(P ), which is the
solution to C′[Q(P )] = P . The maximum profit as a function of P is, therefore, given by
Πmax(P ) = PQ(P )− C[Q(P )], (3)
for all P ∈ [P, P ]. Using Eqs. (1) and (3), we can write the magnitude of regret, R(P ), as
R(P ) = Πmax(P )−Π(P ) = PQ(P )− C[Q(P )]− [PQ− C(Q)], (4)
for all P ∈ [P, P ].
We can now state the regret-averse firm’s ex-ante decision problem. At the beginning
of the period, the firm chooses an output level, Q, so as to maximize the expected value of
its regret-theoretical utility function defined in Eq. (2):
max
Q≥0
E{Π(P˜ )− βG[R(P˜ )]}, (5)
where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the cumulative distribution function,
F (P ), and Π(P ) and R(P ) are given by Eqs. (1) and (4), respectively. The first-order
5Bleichrodt et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that regret functions are indeed convex.
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condition for program (5) is given by
E(P˜ )−C′(Q∗) + βE{G′[R∗(P˜ )][P˜ −C′(Q∗)]} = 0, (6)
where Q∗ is the optimal output level, and R∗(P ) = PQ(P ) −C[Q(P )]− [PQ∗ −C∗(Q∗)].
Differentiating E{U [Π(P˜ )]} twice with respect to Q yields
∂2E{U [Π(P˜ )]}
∂Q2
= −βE{G′′[R(P˜ )][P˜ − C′(Q)]2} − E{1 + βG′[R(P˜)]}C′′(Q) < 0, (7)
for all Q > 0, where the inequality follows from the properties of G(R) and C(Q). Eq.
(7) implies that Eq. (6) is both necessary and sufficient for Q∗ to be the unique optimal
solution to program (5).
3. Regret aversion and production
As a benchmark, suppose that the firm is not regret averse in that β = 0. It then follows
from Eq. (6) with β = 0 that the optimal output level, Q◦, in this benchmark case solves
E(P˜ )−C′(Q◦) = 0. (8)
To examine the impact of regret aversion on the firm’s production decision, we compare
Q∗ with Q◦. To this end, we differentiate E{U [Π(P˜ )]} with respect to Q, and evaluate the
resulting the derivative at Q = Q◦ to yield
∂E{U [Π(P˜)]}
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q◦
= βE{G′[R◦(P˜ )][P˜ − E(P˜ )]}, (9)
where we have used Eq. (8), and R◦(P ) = PQ(P ) − C[Q(P )] − [PQ◦ − C(Q◦)] for all
P ∈ [P, P ]. It then follows from Eqs. (6) and (7) that Q∗ > (<) Q◦ if, and only if, the
right-hand side of Eq. (9) is positive (negative).
To gain more insights, we consider an example in which the regret function is quadratic,
i.e., G(R) = aR + bR2, where a and b are positive constants. We further assume that the
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cost function is also quadratic, C(Q) = cQ2, where c is a positive constant. In this example,
we have Q(P ) = P/2c and R(P ) = [P − E(P˜ )]2/4c. Hence, Eq. (9) becomes
∂E{U [Π(P˜)]}
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q◦
=
bβ
2c
E{[P˜ − E(P˜ )]3}. (10)
It then follows from Eq. (10) that Q∗ > (<) Q◦ if, and only if, the third central moment,
E{[P˜ − E(P˜ )]3}, is positive (negative). Hence, if P˜ is symmetrically distributed, we have
Q∗ = Q◦. On the other hand, if P˜ is positively (negatively) skewed, we have Q∗ > (<) Q◦.
Motivated by the above example, we can look for a critical CDF of P˜ , denoted by F ◦(P ),
such that P˜ has the same mean with respect to F (P ) and F ◦(P ), and that Q∗ = Q◦. Thus,
we have
∫ P
P F (P )dP =
∫ P
P F
◦(P )dP and
∫ P
P
G′[R◦(P )][P − E(P˜ )]dF ◦(P ) = 0. (11)
We say that F (P ) has more simple positive (negative) skewness than F ◦(P ) if, and only
if,
∫ P
P [F (x) − F
◦(x)]dx ≤ (≥) 0 for all P ≤ E(P˜ ) and
∫ P
P [F (x)− F
◦(x)]dx ≥ (≤) 0 for all
P ≥ E(P˜ ). To see this, note that
∫ P
P
[P − E(P˜ )]3d[F (P ) − F ◦(P )] = 6
∫ P
P
[P − E(P˜ )]
{∫ P
P
[F (x)− F ◦(x)]dx
}
dP, (12)
where the equality follows from integration by parts and
∫ P
P F (P )dP =
∫ P
P F
◦(P )dP . If
F (P ) has more simple positive (negative) skewness than F ◦(P ), the right-hand side of Eq.
(12) is positive (negative) so that the third central moment is larger (smaller) with respect
to F (P ) than with respect to F ◦(P ).
We state and prove our main result.
Proposition 1. If G′′′(R) ≥ 0, a sufficient condition that ensures the firm to increase
(decrease) its optimal output level, i.e., Q∗ > (<) Q◦, when regret aversion prevails is that
the uncertain per-unit price, P˜ , has a CDF, F (P ), that has more simple positive (negative)
skewness than the critical CDF, F ◦(P ).
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Proof. Let H(P ) = G′[R◦(P )][P − E(P˜ )]. Then, we have
H ′′(P ) = G′′′[R◦(P )][Q(P )−Q◦]2[P − E(P˜ )]
+G′′[R◦(P )][P − E(P˜ )]Q′(P ) + 2G′′[R◦(P )][Q(P )−Q◦]. (13)
Since Q(P ) < (>) Q◦ whenever P < (>) E(P˜ ) and Q′(P ) = 1/C′′[Q(P )] > 0, Eq. (13)
implies that H ′′(P ) < (>) 0 whenever P < (>) E(P˜ ). Using integration by parts twice and
Eq. (11), we can write the right-hand side of Eq. (9) as
β
∫ P
P
H(P )d[F (P )− F ◦(P )] = β
∫ P
P
H ′′(P )
{∫ P
P
[F (x)− F ◦(x)]dx
}
dP, (14)
since
∫ P
P F (P )dP =
∫ P
P F
◦(P )dP . If F (P ) has more simple positive (negative) skewness
than F ◦(P ), the right-hand side of Eq. (14) is positive (negative) so that Q∗ > (<) Q◦. 2
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. When F (P ) has more simple positive
skewness than F ◦(P ), realizations of P˜ close to P are much less likely to be seen than those
close to P . Introducing regret aversion to the firm makes the firm concern more about the
disutility from the discrepancy of its output level, Q(P ) − Qn, when high realizations of
P˜ are revealed. To avoid regret, the regret-averse firm optimally adjusts its output level
upward from Qn so that Q∗ > Qn. On the other hand, when F (P ) has more simple negative
skewness than F ◦(P ), realizations of P˜ close to P are much more likely to be seen than
those close to P . The regret-averse firm as such optimally adjusts its output level downward
from Qn to reduce the discrepancy of its output level, Qn −Q(P ), when low output prices
are revealed so that Q∗ < Qn.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we revisit the regret-theoretical model of the competitive firm under price
uncertainty as recently developed by Wong (2014). Regret-averse preferences are character-
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ized by a modified utility function that includes additive separable disutility from having
chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference
between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal pro-
duction decision had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price.
We show that the firm optimally produces more (less) when regret aversion prevails if the
random output price is positively (negatively) skewed. In this case, high (low) output prices
are much more likely to be seen than low (high) output prices. To avoid regret, the firm
is induced to raise (lower) its output optimal level. This paper as such offers more gen-
eral sufficient conditions under which regret aversion has unambiguous effect on the firm’s
production decision.
References
Bell, D. E., 1982. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research 30,
961–981.
Bell, D. E., 1983. Risk premiums for decision regret. Management Science 29, 1156–1166.
Bleichrodt, H., Cillo, A., Diecidue, E., 2010. A quantitative measurement of regret theory.
Management Science 56, 161–175.
Braun, M., Muermann, A., 2004. The impact of regret on the demand for insurance. Journal
of Risk and Insurance 71, 737–767.
Broll, U., Eckwert, B., Wong, K. P., 2014. Transparency and risk sharing in international
trade. The Manchester School 82, 716–731.
Broll, U., Welzel, P., Wong, K. P., 2015. Exchange rate risk and the impact of regret on
trade. Open Economies Review 26, 109–119.
Loomes, G., 1988. Further evidence of the impact of regret and disappointment in choice
under uncertainty. Economica 55, 47–62.
Regret Theory and the Competitive Firm Revisited 8
Loomes, G., Starmer, C., Sugden, R., 1992. Are preferences monotonic—testing some
predictions of regret theory. Economica 59, 17–33.
Loomes, G., Sugden, R., 1982. Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under
uncertainty. Economic Journal 92, 805–824.
Loomes, G., Sugden, R., 1987. Testing for regret and disappointment in choice under
uncertainty. Economic Journal 97, 118–129.
Muermann, A., Mitchell, O., Volkman, J., 2006. Regret, portfolio choice and guarantee in
defined contribution schemes. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 39, 219–229.
Paroush, J., Venezia, I., 1979. On the theory of the competitive firm with a utility function
defined on profits and regret. European Economic Review 12, 193–202.
Quiggin, J., 1994. Regret theory with general choice sets. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
8, 153–165.
Sandmo, A., 1971. On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty. American
Economic Review 61, 65–73.
Starmer, C., Sugden, R., 1993. Testing for juxtaposition and event-splitting effects. Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty 6, 235–254.
Sugden, R., 1993. An axiomatic foundation of regret. Journal of Economic Theory 60,
159–180.
Wong, K. P., 2011. Regret theory and the banking firm: the optimal bank interest margin.
Economic Modelling 28, 2483–2487.
Wong, K. P., 2012. Production and insurance under regret aversion. Economic Modelling
29, 1154–1160.
Wong, K. P., 2014. Regret theory of the competitive firm. Economic Modelling 36, 172–175.
Wong, K. P., 2015. A regret theory of capital structure. Finance Research Letters 12,
48–57.
